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NOTE AND COMMENT
W4-RCVOCATION BY JuDICIA, Uns.ATioN.--Wills and their revocation
as we kno* them are peculiarly the result of the actions and reactions of our
common and statute law. We are sufficiently familiar with statutes, declara-
tory of the common law, in derogation thereof, and creating entirely new
principles of law. We also know law the result of no legislative act. What-
eyer may or may not be admitted about court-made law, we see the undoubt-
ed fact that the great body of our law is the outgrowth of decisions applying
to new conditions principles of law found in analogous cases, whereby the
common law is able to adapt itself to our changing conditions, and keep step
with the march of progress. We are not unaccustomed to judicial interpre-
tation that practically nullifies statutes, or gives to them an effect that would
surprise the legislators originating them. We do not so often come upon pretty
open contests between court and legislature, cases of judicial usurpation re-
suiting in rules of law flatly contradictory to the words of the statutes.
A notable instance is found in the law as to revocation of wills, and an
excursion through a certain line of cases is interesting not merely for this,
but also for the curious mistakes of judges and text writers in studying and
applying the precedents relied upon to establish the rule. Feudal require-
ments long delayed the right by will to dispose of lands, and there was not
much personalty to bequeath. Such as there was might be bequeathed very
informally, and by resort to uses a practical way was found to make what
amounted to testamentary disposition of lands. After 154o, Statute 32 Henry
VIII, this could be done by last will and testament in writing. No form or
signature was requiredi and personalty was disposable as before. See Butler
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and Baker's case, 3 Coke 25, 31, 76 Eng. Rep. 684, and footnotes. For the
purpose of this note this statute is of small moment. The Statute of Frauds
and the Statute i Vict. are the great statutes of wills, and the former, more
largely than the latter, has furnished the model for American statutes.
Hence cases under the Statute of Frauds are of greater -interest in most
American jurisdictions.
The Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Charles II, c. 3, required devises to be "in
writing and signed by the party so devising." They must also be duly at-
tested and subscribed by witnesses. Bequests of personalty might still be
oral, but nuncupative wills were strictly limited, though no formal require-
ments were made for written wills of personalty. The Statute i Vict. re-
quired the same formalities for the testamentary disposition of real and
personal property. Frauds and perjuries had occurred not merely in setting
up wills, but also in attempting to prove revocation by word of mouth. The
Statute of Frauds, therefore, provided in section VI that no devise, nor any
clause thereof, should be revocable otherwise than by certain destructive
acts to the instrument, or by certain specified instruments declaring the same.
To make doubly sure, the section says this over in another way, declaring
that "all devises and bequests(?) of lands and tenements shall remain and
continue.in force" until revoked in one of those specified ways. And finally,-
for treble assurance the section concludes, "any-former law or usage to the
contrary notwithstanding." This is said, though doubtfully, to have been
drawn by CnANCJ.OR NOTiiNGHAM, as the result of a very shocking case
of perjury and subornation of perjury in proving revocation of a will, a
case tried before him the year previous, z676. Cole v. Mordaunt, in a note 4
Ves. z96, also discussed in Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. 502 (C1. KVNT).It was doubtless supposed that by these very positive words the door
was bolted, barred and s~ded against the admission of any other manner of
revocation, and so it seemed to BAwoN PtEtor. Not so to his brother barons,
who soon found that no revocation "otherwise than by the ways specified"
had left as before revocations implied 'by law! Christopher v. Christopher,
Dick. 445, and so it was held in Kenebel v. Scrafton, 2 East s30, per LD.
Ew NiDo3uGH, and after great consideration by all the judges of the three
courts of Westminster Hall in Marston v. Roe d. Fox, 8 Ad. & El. x4, per
TINDUL C. J. (x838). Parliament, seeing how the attacking forces of the com-
mon law had made inroads on the undoubted territory embraced by the Sta-
tute of Frauds as to revocation, took counsel of strategy, and determined to
provide for revocation by changed circumstances, but t6 do it in its own
way, and so indubitably that the courts should not venture another attack.
It did not require both marriage "and. birth'of a child, but by the Statute
x Vict., c. 26, 1837, it enacted that, i. "Every will made by a man or woman
shall be revokecd by his or her marriage" (except in certain cases under a
power); 2. "no will shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention on
the ground of an alteration of circumstances," and 3. "no will or codicil, or
any part thereof shall be revoked otherwise than as aforesaid, or" by other
means specified, these being mainly as named in the Statute of Frauds. Thus
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-were the courts forbidden to invent any more methods of revocation. And
they L-ve obeyed, as will later appear, with very absurd results in some
cases. But for these, Parliament and not the courts may be blamed.
Such was the law as to wills made from and after Jan. x, x838. In z8s8,
the case of Goods of Cadywold, came on to be decided by that most learned
judge of probate law, Sm CaRmswm. Cazswr. In that case one T. Cady-
wold made a will devising all his reil estate to Elizabeth Soundy, his intended
wife, for life, and then for the benefit of any children they might have liv-
ing at his decease, or born in due time afterwards, and the residue of his
personal estate to his intended wife absolutely. Thomas and Elizabeth car-
ried out their marital plans, and in course of time he died, leaving her and
four children surviving him. Then the question arose whether his widow,
and executrix, could have probated this will which had been made for this
very purpose. And the Q. C. Dr. Addams who had been instructed to move
for probate of this paper, on the strength of Marston v. Fox, supra, "appre-
lhended it could not be granted." With this agreed Sm CaRssw= CaMswu=,
who said, "It seems at first sight rather startling to say that a will like the
present, executed in contemplation of marriage*** should be revoked by
such marriage," but on the cases cited so the law stands.
Now it does not appear that Sir Cresswell was relying on the positive
provision of z Vict. that marriage revokes a will, and he should not, for
though the case was'decided in z858, the will was made in z828, and therefore
-did not fall under i Vict. When we turn to the cases cited we find that
Morston v. Fox, supra, decided that notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds,
contra, the courts had let in another manner of revocation, i. e., by presump-
tion of law from a change in the testator's circumstances. This change was
marriage and birth of a child or children. On the strength of this presump-
tion, which was a rigid--though court-made-presumption of law, and de-
pended not.at all on the intent of the testator, this will of T. Cadywold,
which he had made for the express purpose of providing for his wife and
children, by the very fact that he had the wife and children was utterly re-
voked! Even while hey were doing it the courts admitted very great dif-
ficulty in reconciling their work with the positive words of the Statute (LoaD
E=NwzouoRu, C. J., in Kenebel v. Scrafton, 2 East S4i), and some cases have
gone the length of calling it usurpation of legislative power, Hoitt v. Hoitt,
63 N. H. 475. Nevertheless, the English courts firmly stood on the ground
they had seized, and the American courts have generally adopted the same
rule. Brush v. Wilkins 4 Johns. Ch. 5o6, per CH. MNT, Warren v. Beach 4
Gray 162, per Sin w C. J.
But to return to the Cadywold case. As it was decided twenty years after
this last edict of Parliament had changed the statute law, it was not pro-
bable many, or any cases, of wills under the old Statute of Frauds would
raise that precise question again. We are not surprised therefore that the
Cadywold case has not been much referred to by the courts, though it has
been very much cited by the text writers, sometimes as applying to I Vict.,
which is, of course, a great error, e. g. The Laws of England, The Earl of
Halsbury, Vol. 28 p. 562. The curious thing is that the editor of an edition
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of Jarman's classical Treatise on Wills, which appeared shortly after the
Cadywold decision, cites this case, p. 125, with the remark that the decision
in Kenebel v. Scrafton, 2 East 53o, was overlooked by Sir C. Cresswell, and
his decision, therefore, cannot be taken as an authority. And Redfield in fiis
Law of Wills, which appeared soon after, fell into the same error, and re-
ferred approvingly to this footnote in Jarman. But the reports of the
Cadywold case all show Kenebel v. Scrafton not only was not overlooked, but
it was on the strength that case that the widow was advised to try to probate
the will. See x'Sw. & Tr. 34, 27 L. J. P. 36, 6 W. R. 375. But Dr. Addams,
Q. C, in following his instructions to move for its probate, apprehends that the
law being as ,held in Marston v. Roe d. Fox, 8 A. & E. x4, it could not be
granted. Evidently neither he nor Sir C. Cresswell read either of those cases,
since both Kenebel v. Scrafton and Marston v. Fox confine the rule of revo-
cation to cases in which there is a failure to provide for the wife and child,
and expressly hold that the will is not revoked if it makes provision for both.
That is precisely what this Cadywold will was intended to do, and hence there
should have been no revocation under the rule of Marston v. Fox, supra.
Dr. Addams refers to another case, viz., Israeli v. Rodon, 2 Moore P. C, 5r,
which was an appeal from the Court of Ordinary in Jamaica. This was a
case decided in z839, in which this same .Dr. Addams, not then a Q. C., ap-
peared~to argue for a revocation of the will. The Privy Council, speaking
through Sir Herbert Jenner, agreed with him, not on the ground that there
was no provision for the wife ind child, but thatithe provision was not ade-
quatr enough to repel the presumption of revocation. That the estates must
havie been considerable would appear from a quarrel the widow had with the
trustees over the disposition of the produce. Israeli v. Rodon. 2 Moore P. C.
42. This adequacy of provision was reading a new element into the rule, not
found in Marston v. Fox, supra, nor in other'cases. The opinion has much
to say of the intent of the testator in making his provisions, and this regard
for intent is quite contrary to the settled rule, which rests not at all on any
supposed intent in the given case, but on a positive presumption of law. The
opinion of the Governor and Ordinary of Jamaica in deciding the case in the
Court of Ordinary is interesting. It appears that Henry Rodon made a will
in England in favor of his sisters and a brother. He then went to Jamaica
and soon married and made settlement of his real estate, but not .of his
personal, which was considerable, upon his wife for life, and afterwards to
his child or children. He died soon, leaving his wife enciente, and a post-
humous daughter was born, the respondent in the case The Governor
thought it clear when the will was made there was no contemplation of mar-
riage. "The question then comes, whether his deed of settlement gave a
secure (?) and sufficient (?) provision for his child, or whether the best
part of his property (that is, his personal estate) should go away from his
child to half-sisters ** * There is a child, now eighteen months old, entirely
dependent on her mother for every present and future benefit, during such
mother's life, and that mother, a young woman about twenty-five years of age,
and having recently married again." The Governor was not a lawyer, but
under the circumstances of this case it seemed to a layman that though he
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might "possibly be wrong in the law of the case," he was positive that 
he was
not wrong in equity. Not impugning the affection of the mother for 
her
child, he notes no proof on the second marriage of provision for the child,
so as to make her independent of the stepfather, who may have married 
the
widow "on some consideration of her property acquired by Rodon." 
This
ingenious suggestion that the provision for the child must be immediate, 
and
not dependent on the death of the mother, does not seem to accord 
with the
cases reviewed in Marsto* v. Fos-, supra, but the. facts in this 
case are so
different from those in the Cadywold case, as to make it no authority, 
for in
the Rodon case the will took the property away from the widow and 
mother,
while in the other it carried the entire property to them.
Before leaving this maze of errors we may notice that this whole doctrine
of revocation by implication of law 
from change of circumstances, seems 
to
have been imported from the Roman law, and is not indigenous to the 
Eng-
lish. That marriage and birth of a child should revoke a will is said 
to be
triced to Overbury v. Overbury, 2 Show. 242 (I682). 89 Eng. Reports 915 and
footnote, and text writers wrongly, but quite generally, cited this 
case as
authority for the doctrine. Jarman Treatise on Wills, *x12 Underhill on the
Law of Wills, Sec. 2, Rood on Wills, Sec. 375, Woerner, The American
Law of Administration, Sec. s4. It is true that the Court of Delegates 
did
borrow the notion from the civilians, who regarded a will which failed 
to
provide for childrin as inofflciosum testamentum, but the Overbury case
said not a word about marriage. To make a willn, "and afterwards 
have
children" and die is the case there put. But the English courts soon held that
there must be both marriage and birth of children. Lgg v. Lugg, 2 Salk,
592 (x696), Doe d. White v. Barford, 4 M. &S. 1o (1815). It is not strange
to find the ecclesiastical courts thus influenced by the Civil Law, see Shepherd
v. Shepherd, note to 5 T. R. 5x, but we have seen how in Marston v. Fox, su-
pra, the entire bench of common law judges at Westminster approved the
doctrine. And American cases and statutes have generally followed the En-
glish. Baldwin v. Spriggs, 65 Md. 373, Durfee v. Risch, x42 Mich. 504, Mc-
Larey's Estate, 153 N. Y. 416.
The question was fully considertd by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass-
achusetts in Irgersoll v. Hopkins, 170 Mass. 4ox. The court erroneously
cites Goods of Cadywold, supra, as authority for the English interpretation
of the Statute of x Vict, passed nine years after the Cadywold will was made,
and holds that under the Massachusetts statute a will made in contemplation
of marriage is revoked by realizing on that contemplation, and that the Mass-
achusetts statute, which, unlike the English, provides'for an exception 
if
"it shall appear from the will itself that the will was made in contemplation
of such marriage," requires that this contemplation shall appear on 
the face
of the will, and all evidence not derived fromthe will itself is excluded. On
this it may be remarked, x. That the Cadywold case cited is no authority 
as
to a will under i Vict., 2. That the only other case cited as interpreting 
the
English statute, Otway v. Sad/eir, 33 L. T. 46, was an Irish case also reported
in 4 Ir. Jur. N. S. 97, in which the Irish court said, "I cannot introduce 
any
qualification into the i8th Section which I do not find in the Statute." This
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
rule of interpretation, if it had been followed in Marston v. Fox, would have
forbidden any revocation by presumption under the Statute of Frauds. It
may be noted in passing that Wills, Part VIII, p. 56z of the Earl of Hals-
bury's Monumental. Laws of England, vol. 28 (1914), lays down the same
construction of the statute, and cites only these two cases, Goods of Cady-
%'old, supra, which is no authority, for a will under the Act i Vict., and this
Irish case. On turning to the list of contributors it appears that Part VIII
was contributed by the late Irish Master of the Rolls, and a member of the
Irish bar. They have, of course, interpreted the Statute as Parliament must
have intended, but with results that are quite absurd when the will, like the
Cadywold will, gives all to the wife and children. We may agree with Sir C
Cresswell, that not only at first sight, but at every other sight, this result
seems, not only rather but altogether startling. The positive language of
Parliament in i Vict. may require this conclusion as to wills made after
Jan. 1, 1838, but in Massachusetts the courts have not that defense, for, 3.
the Massachusetts statute does not apply this rule of revocation when it ap-
pears from the will itself "by fair inference from its provisions as applied to
the parties and the subjects to which it relates, that the will was made in
contemplation of the marriage that was subsequently solemnized,".to use the
paraphrase of the trial judge who had upheld the will. The high court found it
must "appear" on the face of the will. The fact that the will gave to the
contemplated wife all the property and made her one of the executors was
not enough, because it required evidence outside the will to show that a will
giving all to Mary Alice Payson, who within a year became his wife, was
made in contemplation of marriage. This was a strict and narrow construc-
tion, and in its results so absurd as to defeat the obvious intent of the statute
without furnishing a single safeguard against fraud. It is always necessary
to go outside the will to determine the identity of devisees and legatees. A
gift to my only son, John, requires evidence aliunde to identify John. The
fact that a man gives all his property to Mary Alice Payson, "single woman,'
ought to be appearance enough on the face of the will to prevent his marriage
to her soon after from defeating his purpose in making the will. It is suggest-
ed in Francis v. Marsh, 54 W. Va. 45, that a man can always prevent this re-
sult by republishing the will after marriage. This, however, is cold comfort to
the wife whose husband has died in ignorance of any such absurd require-
ment of the law. We remark on this case, 4. That fortunately the cases are
few where the testator would fail in his will to make some reference to his
intended marriage. There seems to have been no case in Massachusetts since
Ingersoll v. Hopkins (1898), and that case has never been cited on that point
in any other jurisdiction This is in part at least due to the fact that the
wording of most statutes would not permit such a result, the Michigan sta-
tute, to take one instance, providing in express terms for "revocation implied
by law from subsequent changes in the conditions and circumstances of the
testator." If we. may judge what the Michigan court would, do from its
language in a late case under this Statute, Durfee v. Risch, r42 Mich. 5o4
(igoS), we may conclude it would follow Marston v. Fox and not Goods of
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Cadywold. This language is, "The reason of the law is the essence and soul
of the law:'
In threading this maze of errors this note is already too long. It may
close without further notice of the present state of the law as to the revoca-
tion of wills by marriage, than a reference to two recent capes reviewing the
subject, Hoy v. Hoy 93 Miss. 732, and annotations in 25 L. R. A. N. S. z82
(19o9), Herzog v. Trust Co. 67 Fla. 54, Ann. Cas. 1917 A'2o, and annotations
p. 203. E. C. 0.
